PDF | On Apr 1, , Richard W. Bulliet and others published A History of Islamic Societies. Ira M. Lapidus A significant admixture of the Tunisian population was with the Islamic invasion of North Africa in 7 th century A.D. by Arabian. Cambridge Core - Islam - A History of Islamic Societies - by Ira M. Lapidus. This third edition of Ira M. Lapidus's classic A History of Islamic Societies has Ira M. Lapidus is Professor Emeritus of History at the University of California.
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Editorial Reviews. Review. Review of previous edition: "This book is a major undertaking and A History of Islamic Societies - Kindle edition by Ira M. Lapidus. Dwight Baker; A History of Islamic Societies. By Ira M. Lapidus. New York: This content is only available as a PDF. Copyright by the. Pp. xxxi, $ Lapidus. Ira M.. A History of Islamic Societies. New York This content is only available as a PDF. © American.
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Download preview PDF. Notes 1. CrossRef Google Scholar 5. For a brief treatment of the subject and references, see Hayrettin YiIcesoy, Tatawwur al -ikr al-siyasi Linda ahl al-sunna: fatrat al-takwin Amman, , — The scholarstook chargeof judicialadministra- tion, local police, irrigation, public works and taxation. They organized education and charities.
They officiated at births, marriagesand deaths. They gave healing and spiritual consola- tion. Another type of religious-basedcommunity organizationwas built aroundSufism. Sufismbegan as the purely individualquest for spiritualenlightenmentand closenessto God amongholy men and ascetics, but it gradually evolved into a social movement.
Sufi masters acquireddisciples. On the military frontiers of the Islamicworld, and subsequentlyin the towns of the interior, the Sufis acquired residences for teaching, missionaryactivity and charitablework. The group structureof Sufismwas progressivelyconsolidated in the course of the tenth and eleventh centuries. The residences, once homes to eclectic comings-together of itinerant mystics, graduallybecame the homes of organizedbrotherhoods. Formal ceremoniessuch as the giving of an ijaza or certificateof learning, the passing-on of the kAirqaor the patched cloak of the master to the disciple, the conferringof a silsilaor chain of authoritative transmissiongoing back from the present masterto the Prophet, turned students into disciples totally dedicatedto the service of the master.
The only route to spiritual salvation was complete dedicationto the master. Then in the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the various groups of Sufi mastersand their disciples were linked together.
Those masters who were students of a common master in the previous generationcame to consider themselves members of a brotherhood,a tarzqa,a loosely affiliatedinternationalassociation of Sufis who shared the same religious practices and spiritual tradition.
Extended Sufi networks were promoted by ambitious masterswho sent their disciplesas khalifasor delegatesto establish branchesof the principalbrotherhood.
The Sufi brotherhoodsorganizednot only the relationsof mastersand disciples,but broughtinto their reach lay affiliates, who looked to the Sufi orders for ritual leader- ship, healing, mediation, welfare services and political spokes- manship. As Sufism spread, the great mass of the population became affiliated with one or several of the brotherhoods in additionto their affiliationto the schools of law.
The schools of law and the Sufi brotherhoodshad become the backbone of Muslim community organization. These religious groups commonly withdrew from political affairs and turned into self-protective communities concerned with worship, ceremonyand healingactivities, the administration of religious law, educationand the upholdingof moralityand of the symbols of an Islamic order.
While many avoided contact with rulers,courtsand the holdersof politicalpower, the religious elites none the less took on a this-worldly responsibilityfor the upholding of community life and for the teaching of religiously defined ways to personal salvation.
Thus they preserved a kind of purity, avoiding the potential corruption of politics, but remainedengagedin the needs of their people. The split between Muslim states and Muslim religious communities which came into the open in the ninth centurywas now fully institutionalized in a structureof society which separatedlocal communityorgan- izations from states.
In the Saljuq period, a new relationship was worked out between states and a society organized into sectarian religious bodies. The newly dominant conquering Turkish peoples and slave war-lords, eager to calm resistance,to assure the passivity of the governedpopulationsand the steady flow of taxes, decided to use the local religious elites and the existing communalstruc- tures as a mechanismto enforce and facilitate their rule.
To do this, they accepted the caliph as the nominalhead of the Islamic community. They agreedto enforceIslamiclaw. They suppressed Shiism by force and assisted in the triumph of Sunni Islam throughoutmuch of the Middle East. They upheld at least some of the symbols of an Islamic order in the ceremonial, literary and artistic statements of the courts.
In order to secure the co-operationof the local religious elites, the Saljuqsconstructed mosques and madrasasin every major city, endowed them with funds to train studentsand religious cadresand made themselves the patrons of the people who spread Islam, administeredlocal affairs and taught obedience to the regime. Patronage allowed them to influence the appointmentsof judges and teachers, and gave the state indirect control over a religious establishment dependent upon it for financialsupport.
They accepted the existing states as the necessary political condition of their era and claimedresponsibilityfor the implementationof the Prophet's traditionin the domain of the small community and individual lives. They were not in fact committed to bringing about a restorationof the true caliphate, and accepted the legitimacy of the Saljuq states.
A similar system was constructed by the Safavidsin Iran between and The expansion of Islamthe world over by conquest,tradeand missionaryactivit- ies also introducedthese institutionsto the Indian subcontinent, the islands of South-East Asia, sub-SaharanAfrica and other regions. In the OttomanEmpirethe evolutionof relationsbetween state and religious elites led to the direct control of the state over 9 Tyan, Institutionsdu droitpublic musulman,ii; M.
Hodgson, The Ventureof Islam, ed. Smith, 3 vols. Chicago, , ii, pp. Laoust, La politiquede Gaza-lz Paris, ; G. On social organization,see R. For the madrasa, see G.
Schoolof Orientaland African Studies,xxiv , pp. The Ottomansbrought ulama judicialand educationalactivitiesunder bureaucraticcontrol. In the course of their expansion, they created a sequence of colleges in Anatolia and the Balkanswhich they organizedinto a teaching hierarchy.
The most recentlyfounded collegesrankedhighest in the bureau- cracy.
Teachers were appointed by the Ottoman state and all teachersparticipatedin a graded hierarchy,advancingfrom col- lege to college as part of a defined careerpath. A similarjudicial hierarchy was created in which the cities of the empire were rankedin order of historicand practicalimportance. Judgeswere promoted from one city to anotheras they climbed through the judicialbureaucracy. At the top of this bureaucracystood the chief qadzsand the qaaRs of the army, who acted as informaladminis- trators of the system.
Judges were particularlyimportantin the Ottomansystem becausethey not only dealt with the administra- tion of religious law, but assisted in the assessmentof taxes, the administrationof army regulations,the supervisionof the urban guilds and the regulationof the urban economy.
In the Ottoman system, an interlockedhierarchywith a defined careercourse for both judges and teachers,supportedby state salariesand endow- ments, brought the whole of the religious establishmentunder state control.
At the same time, the Ottomanssuppressedinde- pendent Sufism. Sufis were either attached to the court or dis- persed. Shiismwas proscribed. By definingthe limits of religious autonomy narrowly, the Ottomans transformedthe system of state patronage of religious activities and informal religious acceptanceof the state authority into a state-dominatedversion of Islam. Itzkowitzand C. Imber London, ;H. Gibband H. Bowen,Islamic Society and the West, 2 vols. Oxford, ;N. Lifchez ed. Keddie ed.
After the conquests,however, the Safavidsmoved away from their combinationof religious and political leadership into original familiardiSerentiationof institutions. In order to the more rule, the Safavidswithdrewtheir charismatic buttress their claimsand built up a more conventional religious establishment.
The shahs provided bureaucracyto the great Shii shrines and otherwise brought endowments for the religious estab- lishmentunder direct control. They violently forms of Islam, including the Sunni schools eliminatedall rival of law and the Sufibrotherhoods.
The Safavidsadopted the prevailing Middle Eastern pattern of differentiated state-political and religio- communalinstitutions. The states focused on publicorder and taxation;the religious military power, communitiesdealt with individual learning, pious practices, prayer socialwelfare and the mediationof local and ritual, disputes. In both the Ottoman and Safavid empires state control over thereligious elites was an extreme variation in the spectrum of relationsbetweenstateand religiouselites foundin Muslim ies.
In the Mughal empire, for example, the societ- state made its own 1lR. Savory,Iran underthe Safavids Cambridge, ;A. Lambton,"Quis custodiet custodes? SomeReflectionson the Persian islamica, v , pp. Aubin,"Lapolitiquereligieuse Safavides",in Le shlisme imamite: Colloquede ,pp. Arjomand, CenturiesA.
Naff and R. Arjomand,The Shadow of God and the Carbondale, ,pp. Under Akbara court cult was estab- lished centredon the ruler, integratingMuslimand Hindu themes in a more universalisticveneration. The court, however, did little to bring outside sectarianreligious activity under state control.
While it endowed madrasasand gave direct patronageto some 'ulama' groups, most religious activity remained autonomous. Reforming movements, Sufi brotherhoodsand Muslim shrines remained independent. In India, there was no single dominant version of Islam and no all-embracingreligious establishment, but rathernumerousindependentand competingreligiousbodies.
This differentiationof state and religious institutionswas not, however, entirely clear-cut.
First, the separationhas never been recognizedin ordinaryMuslimdiscourseabout state and religion, and it has only occasionallyreceivedformalrecognitionin Muslim politicaltheory. It did win an indirecttacit acceptance. Beginning in the eleventh century, Muslim theorists such as al-Baqillanl, al-Mawardland Ibn Taymlya attempted to devise a new theory of the caliphateto preservethe historicaland religiouscontinuity of the Muslim community and to symbolize the ideal existence of the ummawhile at the sametime allowingfor historicalactualit- ies.
The upshot of their theorizing was that the state was not a direct expression of Islam, but a secular institution whose duty it was to uphold Islam; the real communityof Muslims was the community of scholarsand holy men who carriedon the legacy of the Prophet in daily life.
While their activitieswere based on siyasa, the exer- cise of power justifiedin its own terms, a form of raisond'etator political rationality, Muslim rulers borrowed the pre-Islamic Persian monarchicalvision of the ruler as a divinely selected person, God's vice-regent on earth for the maintenanceof order and the shepherdingand protectionof the common people.
The Perso-Islamic political tradition also saw the ruler as an ideal humanbeing, the equivalentof the Hellenisticphilosopher-king, 12 E.
Watt, Islamic Political Thought Edinburgh, On juristicpoliticaltheory, see A. Ibish, The Political Doctrineof al-Baqillani Beirut, ;al-Mawardl, Les statutsgouverne- mentauxou reglesdu droitpublic et administratif,trans.
Farrukh Beirut, ;H. Laoust,Essai sur les doctrines socialeset politiquesde Takl-d-Dln Ahmadb. Taimzya,canonistehanbalite Cairo, The apart from Islam, was a sacred figure; the state, a ruler, divinely appointedinstitution. Finally, there was an ambiguityin the concept of secular and sacred. The ordinary functions of Muslim community life and the daily activities of scholars and holy men involve activities which come under the purview of Islamiclaw and Islamic ity, but constitute from our point of view the realm moral- of secular affairs.
Business, administrationof trusts, property issues and inheritancesare only a few examples. The domainof the Muslim religious community which embodies the Islamic ideal is, by virtue of Islam itself, the realm of the mundane. VI THE UNITARY IDEAL Whilethe institutionalseparationof state and religion was the normfor Middle Eastern and other Islamic societies, the altern- ativeconcept, derived from the experienceof the Prophet, of an identityof political and religious authorityand of state and reli- giouscommunity,remainedimportantin tribalsocieties, inspired resistanceto state authority,and sometimesled to the ofestablishedregimes and the formationof new overthrow tribal empires.
Inmany rural areas, the local religious teachers were popularly veneratedSufis who did not accept the state order and led tribal resistanceto both the dominantregimes and the urban forms of communal organization. They developedtheirown set of religious ideas,blending Islamic precepts with local non-Muslim popular religioustraditions, to maintainthe separatenessand independ- enceof their peoples from the city-based, state-ruled dominant society.
They sometimesorganizedtheir peoples for war and for conquest. These tribal empires, however, would also go through thesame evolutionarytrajectoryas the early Arab caliphateand eventuallyconformto the more generalhistoricalMiddle Eastern modes of differentiationof state and religious organization.
North Africa was the most fertile region for unitary ments. The Rustamid dynasty came to power on the basis of Kharijism;the Idrlsids and the Fatimids were Shii dynasties; the Almoravidsand the Almohads adopted reformist Islam; in Morocco, the Sa'dian and Filall dynasties were based upon the Sufi qualitiesof the leadersof the tribal-Islamicmove- ments.
These societies were based upon the integral unity of tribe, religious associationand state. The Fatimid case, however, illustratesan ambiguousoutcome. A unified religio-political movement evolved into a full-scale Middle Eastern empire with only partly differentiatedstate and religious institutions.
The Fatimids were at first the leaders of a Berber reformist movement, but after the conquest of North Africa and Egypt in , they became the rulers of a Middle Easternempirebuilt upon slave militaryforces and a bureaucratic administrationinherited from previous regimes.
In this case, however, the separationof state and religiousinstitutionswas not as clearly marked as in the case of the 'Abbasid Empire. The Fatimid caliphsalways maintainedthat they were the direct des- cendants of 'All and of the Prophet, and they maintained in principle an overarchingreligiousauthority. Fatimid- Shii affiliationremainedthe special religion of the political elite. The mass of the Egyptian population continued its Sunni affili- ations.
In this case there seems to have been only a partialdiSer- entiation of religious and political institutionson the state level, and a deep gulf between the state elites and the commonpeople. The movement which brought this dynasty to power was originally a coalition of southern Moroccanpastoral peoples under the leadership of Sufi reformers. Sufism had becomeimportantin Moroccoas the organizingbasisof Moroccan resistance to Spanish and Portuguese occupation of the coastal 13 On North Africa, see J.
Manheim Princeton, ;C. Petrie New York, The Safavid Empire Islamic empires compared Inner Asia from the Mongol conquests to the nineteenth century Islamic societies in Southeast Asia The African context: Islam, slavery, and colonialism Islam in Sudanic, Savannah, and forest West Africa The West African Jihads Islam in East Africa and the European colonial empires The varieties of Islamic societies The global context Part IV.
The Modern Transformation: Introduction: imperialism, modernity, and the transformation of Muslim societies