Fr. Hegel. Dr. and Professor of Philosophy in Jena, Member of the. Ducal Mineralogical Society, Assessor to the Society and. Member of other learned societies. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit () is one of the most influential Title: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: The phenomenology of spirit / Georg Wilhelm. This translation of Hegel's Phdnomenologie des Geistes has been made from the fifth edi- THE Phenomenology of Spirit, firs t pu blished in , is a work.
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THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND. G. W. F. HEGEL .. C. SPIRIT IN THE CONDITION OF BEING CERTAIN OF ITSELF: MORALITY C. Spirit in the Condition of Being Certain of Itself Morality The Phenomenology of Spirit, written in by G.W. Hegel while teaching at the University of Jena. Phenomenology of Spirit emerges as the most important, but also perhaps . Hegel's Phenomenology of spirit / Ludwig Siep ; translated from the German by.
And NO private conversations during class. The university also subscribes to the principle of academic integrity. The Three Principles. Overview of the Course. What is happening in the world today? Supp Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel. What is the only thing it is impossible to Doubt? February 6 [Read Hegel , ; Analysis , xii-xxx Summary. Stern ; 53 Summary , ; How does Understanding come to know that there are in fact no Forces indeed nothing at all! February 13 [Read Hegel ; Stern ; Marianne Williamson Lecture.
We have now reached a critical turning-point in the Phenomenology. And why does the Slave, not the Master, make all further historical progress?
Observation of a Nature: inorganic-organic, b Self-Consciousness: logical-psychological laws, and c Self-Consciousness: physiognomy-phrenology. Why does Reason find it hard to discover classifications and laws in Nature? Review: Questions? What is the Result of this section? April 3 [Read Hegel ; How can we solve poverty, war, terrorism?
TJH , Give a brief summary of the various types of Natural Religion , , and Religion in the form of Art , , and their limitations. Education Video. May 1 [Read same: Hegel ; , etc. When we come to a work of thinking, we should entertain no illusion as to what awaits us in reading the work. We do not come to grips with a work. Either we are prepared for confronting the task with all its demands, or we are simply not yet prepared. No interpretive introduction or commentary will change that.
We must be sincere with ourselves. More than anything else, a work of thinking calls for sincerity. Such a sincerity already knows that the labyrinthian device of an introduction cannot circumvent the actual encounter with the work of thinking. We must face the work as it is. If we fail to do so, if we get into the work in accordance with the suggestions made in the introduction, then we run the risk of learning later that those suggestions are peripheral, external to the work, xii Translators' Foreword and inappropriate.
Thus, they will need correction. But since the correction of those views or suggestions is accomplished by getting into the work itself, then why not begin with the work in the first place?
That is why volumes of the Gesamtausgabe of Heidegger's works are not supplemented with an introduction or brief commentary. Instead, the reader should face the work in the freedom in which the work comes forth as a work of thinking.
This freedom is not preserved when the work is considered to be a riddle whose basic solutions are expected to be found in a brief commentary or introduction.
The text of Hegels Phiinomenologie des Geistes appears without an introduction or brief commentary, because nothing should stand between this work and its readers, who attentively participate in the work of thinking therein. This present text needs not to have such a commentary or introduction, because the character of this text-as a reading that participates in the movement of the work of thinking that is opened up for us in the textwork-demonstrates above all else the inappropriateness of such an introduction.
There is no question that, when an introduction is added to a work, a specific way of reading the work is suggested. But this specific way of reading the work is not the only way to read the work.
When Derrida supplements his translation of this work with an introduction and commentary. Whatever the merits of Derrida's commentary-and these merits are certainly there-there is no doubt that his introduction and his comments stand between the reader and Husserl's work. By contrast, we can say: The absence of an introduction in the original edition of Hegels Phiinomenologie des Geistes safeguards the independence of the work of thinking as it occurs in the space of freedom that is necessary for the flourishing of the work itself.
The Tension of TTanslation. The work character of the work of thinking. In both Hegel and Heidegger, this language takes on a unique character. In order to say what needs to be said, both Hegel and Heidegger speak a rigorous and precise language that goes beyond the traditional language of philosophy. In this new territory that language traverses, as it is molded in the works of Hegel and Heidegger, thinking itself enters new territories.
It is easy to accuse both Hegel and Heidegger of taking inappropriate measures with language, of wanting to be deliberately abstruse, obscure, and unclear. This accusation comes from the reluctance to recognize that in both phi- Translators' Foreword xiii losophers language manifests new territories of thinking. If we grasp the urgency of what these philosophers want to think, then we realize that they cannot say what they think without saying it in their own way.
But precisely this demand that the work of thinking places on both Hegel and Heidegger, as language was molded in their thinking, sometimes leads to virtually insurmountable difficulties for the translator. The difficulties in translating Hegel and Heidegger arise mainly in pointing, in anotheT language, to the territories that these thinkers have opened up.
It goes without saying that there is no general rule or universal method for doing this. Beyond bending and twisting the existing resources of a language, in order to let it fit the needs of what is being translated, we as translators are mindful of the realms or territories that this work opens up.
The desire to deal as adequately as possible with these difficulties prompted us to work closely with the French translation of this volume, by Emmanuel Martineau. Aware of these difficulties and with an eye or ear toward letting those difficulties resonate for the reader of this English translation, we offer here the following reflections on significant tensions that arose in our work of translation and how we have chosen to resolve them: 1.
As already mentioned, the phrase "die Phiinomenologie des Geistes" appears in the German edition without italics. Sometimes it refers to Hegel's text and is a title; and sometimes it refers to the process or movement of the thinking that is underway: the phenomenology of spirit as the very work of thinking. In each case we have tried to determine which sense of the phrase was operative.
In this translation, Phenomenology of Spirit in italics and capitalized refers, obviously, to the Hegel text, whereas the phrase "the phenomenology of spirit" without italics, in lower case, and without quotation marks refers to that movement in thinking that is the work of the phenomenology of spirit.
The same problem, distinction, and solution apply to the Logie-Hegel's text-and to "logic"-the movement of logic in the work of thinking. We are aware that there is interpretation involved in this procedure and, moreover, that we are thereby making a distinction that the German edition-and perhaps even Heidegger himself-did not or did not need to make.
Does the work of thinking that we the readers participate in suffer more with the distinction or without it? In consultation with the French translation, we have occasionally changed the paragraph divisions in order to make possible a smoother and more readable text. The use of italics in the translation varies from that in the German edition.
Italics in Heidegger's original text serve to emphasize certain things within the context of oral delivery and are less appropriate for the written text. Moreover, italics are part of the language and should be used according xiv Translators' Foreword to peculiarities of the particular language. Thus, our italics are not always those that appear in Heidegger's text. We found that at times we could not wisely carry the italics over into our English rendition.
On the other hand, we found that at times the English requires italics when the German does not. Thus, in some instances our use of italics varies from the original German, based on our understanding that the use of italics is not just a technical aspect that exists independently of the specific language being used, but is part and parcel of the language itself, one of its gestures.
We used A. Miller's translation of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, while making emendations to that translation. At times we found it necessary to deviate from the English Hegel terminology-e. Given these various issues in general and within that context, we offer the following reflections on significant tensions within individual words: absolvent.
There is no English equivalent for this word. It is, of course, not really a German word either. The term absolvent is crucial for the work that Heidegger does with Hegel's text. Thus, we kept the word in our translation, without ignoring entirely the possibilities offered by such English words as "detachment" or "the act of detaching. Throughout this translation, we have translated aufzeigen as "showing up"-and not, as is commonly done, as "pointing out.
A common word in German, dieses is used in Hegel's text to indicate that he wants to think something which is not yet thought in traditional ways of thinking about a thing. When Hegel says "dieses," he wants to think a thing as it is on its way to becoming an object for consciousness. When Heidegger uses the words "diesig" or "das Diesige," he is reconsidering this same process and finds that to be "dieses" a thing must have the character of a dieses, must be diesig.
Only thus can a thing be on its way to becoming an object for consciousness. Thus, we have translated diesig as "having the character of a this. English has two possibilities: particular or individual. The nuance of each of these words in English is perhaps more a matter of style than of 1rrarudators' Jrore1Vord XV anything else. We have translated einzeln consistently as "particular," even though we are aware that a case can be made for the appropriateness of the word individual in some instances.
It is our judgment that Hegel uses this word in two senses: as "indifferent" and as. First, meinen and das Meinen can sometimes be translated into English as "meaning," but more often as "intending. Second, the connection that these words have in their German rootedness is impossible to maintain in English translation. The reader simply needs to remember that the words are rooted together in German. This is a crucial technical term for Hegel. It presented us with a special difficulty, in that the most readable English translation-"middle term"-carries with it a possibly misleading nuance.
We might have chosen "middle," "midpoint," or "mid-point. We hope that translating rein as "sheer" rather than "pure" will allow us to get closer to what Hegel has in mind. It seems to us that the English word sheer better reflects the absolute character of the process which Hegel has in mind. These words are usually translated as "perceiving" and "perception" respectively.
We have also done that. This meaning is implied in the English word perception, but it is not explicit. Wahr-nehmen as "taking-for-true" is of central philosophical concern for Hegel as well as for Heidegger reading Hegel. This term in Hegel refers at times to the process of knowing and at times to knowledge itself.
Thus, we have translated wissen sometimes as "knowing" and sometimes as "knowledge. Note: We have translated the German word die Erkenntnis as "cognition," precisely to reserve the English words knowing and knowledge for wissen.
We found that Heidegger's word zugrundegehen is as xvi Translaton' Foreword diverse as Hegel's aufheben. Thus, we have translated it variously as "running aground," "going under," and ''being annihilated. All additions to the German text by the translators are within square brackets [ ], including information that was added in the footnotes.
Significant and problematical German words that we chose to carry along in the body of the text are also in square brackets. Footnotes from the German edition are at the bottom of the page and are numbered consecutively from the beginning of each major section-following the German text.
Translators' footnotes are at the bottom of the page, in brackets, and are designated by asterisks. Footnotes designated by asterisks without brackets contain information that appears in the text itself in the German edition. The numbers in the running heads refer to the pagination of the German edition.
References to Hegel Texts. In an attempt to clarify which texts by Hegel and which editions are being referred to in Heidegger's text and to make proper and adequate reference to English translations of these Hegel texts, we have proceeded in the following way in all footnote references: 1.
We have reproduced the references that appear in the German edition as they appear there. When there is simply a Roman numeral and page number, it refers to the volumes of Hegel's Gesamtawgabe of ff. The later and more accessible Jubiliiumsawgabe reproduces in its margins the volume and page number of the edition. Phiinomenologie des Geistes, hrsg.
Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. Besides the Pherwmenology of Spirit, the English translations of two other Hegel texts are referred to in the footnotes simply as "E. Surber Atascadero, Calif.
Miller Atlantic Highlands, N. All other references to English translations appear in brackets in the respective footnotes. This translation owes an immeasurable amount to the generous help that it has received from Robert Bernasconi, both in terms of the preparation of references to the various editions of Hegel's works and in terms of a careful and concern-filled reading of our text. We express our deepest gratitude to him, even as we assume full and final responsibility for this work of translation.
We also thank John Sallis for his careful reading of the text of this translation. We are grateful to the National Endowment for the Humanities for partial support of this project. Parvis Emad Kenneth Maly Notes 1. Martin Heidegger, Wegmarken, Gesamtausgabe. Band 9 Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann Verlag, , pp. Heidegger focuses on these sections because it is precisely in them that the further development and overcoming of Kant's position in the Critique of Pure Reason take place.
Collingwood makes some interesting remarks on the fundamental inadequacy of merely reading a text, in his Autobiography Oxford: Oxford University Press, , pp.
Martin Heidegger, Lettre a J. Palmier , in M.
Haar ed. Martin Heidegger, La "Phinominologie de l'esprit" de Hegel, trans. Martineau Paris: Editions Gallimard, By discussing the title of this work in its various versions, we shall provide ourselves with a necessarily preliminary understanding of the work. Then, bypassing the lengthy preface and introduction, we shall begin with the interpretation at that place where the matter itself begins. Phenomenology of Spirit, the current title of the work, is certainly not the original title.
It became the definitive title for the work only after it was used in the complete edition of Hegel's works, published by his friends from onward, following immediately after his death. Phenomenology of Spirit is the second volume of the Complete Works and was published in Johannes Schulze, the editor, reports in his foreword that at the time of his sudden death, Hegel was himself preparing a new edition. For what purpose and in what manner this was a new edition can be gleaned from that foreword.
The work is thereby given a principal and comprehensive title: System of Science. The Phenomenology is attached to this system and ordered under it. Thus, the content of the work can be grasped only by considering this inner task, which-on the surface-consisted in being the first item in and for the system.
Hegel"s philosophical works will be cited by volume and page number from the Complete Edition of ff.. In its reissue as the Jubilee Edition. The ayatem of the phenomenology and of the encyclopedia To what extent does the system of science require the Phenomenology of Spirit as its first part?
What does this subtitle mean? Before we answer this question, we must recall that this subtitle, which later became the only title of the work, is not the complete title. The subtitle Science of the Experience of Consciowness was then turned into Science of the Phenomenology of Spirit, out of which grew the abbreviated and familiar title Phenomenology of Spirit.
In discussing the title, we must obviously stay with the most complete version of it, which appeared in two forms, both of which say the same thing in different ways. From the most complete title, it can be inferred that the first part of the system of science is itself science: it makes up "the jiTst part of science. But aside from this first part, no other part of the system of science ever appeared. However, soon after the appearance of the Phenomenology of Spirit in , Hegel began publishing a work known as the Logic.
But the Logic did not appear as the second part of the system of science. Or is this Logic, in accord with the matter at issue therein, the remaining second part of the system?
Yes and no. Yes, insofar as the complete title of the Logic also indicates a connection with the System of Science. The actual title of this work reads: Science of Logic-unusual and strange, for us as well as for Hegel's time.